Since Baier and Bergstrand (2004) there has been a focus on empirically testing the economic determinants of signing a free trade agreement (FTA). However, FTAs do not imply an agreement on services; a separate economic integration (EIA) is needed. As trade in services is one of the fastest growing sectors of the global economy, it is important to pay special attention to these agreements. We use the methodology of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) to investigate di¤erences in the determinants of signing an agreement on goods trade and services trade. In addition to the standard economic variables, we include variables for skilled/unskilled labor, and political stability. We …nd in general, qualitative similarities (though di¤erent magnitudes) and some robust speci…c di¤erences.
Introduction
The Trade literature has widely focused on the impact of signing a trade agreement on the amount of trade in goods between the two countries and consequently the welfare within these countries. However, less attention has been paid to the economic factors that encourage two (or more) countries to sign such trade agreements -and even less towards why countries sign an agreement with respect to services trade. With regards to trade agreements in goods, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , or B-B, were the …rst to provide empirical evidence indicating which geographical and economic characteristics a¤ect the likelihood of a pair of countries having a free trade agreement (FTA) . The predictions of their model are based on a numerical version of the theoretical models of Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995) and covers agreements that have been signed up to 1996 with a sample of 54 countries. Since 1996, more than 80 agreements have been signed and the economic characteristics of countries may have changed. Though we update the data and analysis of B-B, this is not our main contribution as B-B has already been extended in various contexts.
1 Our main contribution is to compare the determinants of services agreements with goods.
B-B do allow for the trade in services in their theoretical model. However, FTAs do not actually cover services and thus this aspect is missing from their empirical analysis and we will argue that an agreement on services trade is more complex than that of an FTA. In fact, prior to 1996 (the year used in B-B), only …ve agreements including both goods and services had been signed. If two countries want to liberalize trade in services, a separate agreement is needed; that is, the countries must sign an economic integration agreement (EIA). There are two important points that need to be made with regard to the distinction between agreements concerning services and goods. The …rst is that, unlike goods, services are not restricted by tari¤s, but by market access. When an agreement is signed, the number of …rms allowed in an industry is predetermined, but the quantity provided by each …rm is determined by the market. The second point, that will be discussed in more detail later, is that unlike an FTA (that implies zero tari¤s on all goods), an EIA does not necessarily translate to full market access for all or even one type of service. To understand this, we need to …rst describe how trade in services are de…ned. There are four de…ned ways, or "modes", of trading services:
Mode 1: Cross-border supply -the possibility for non-resident service suppliers to supply services cross-border into the Member's territory (e.g. bank transfers).
Mode 2: Consumption abroad -the freedom for the Member's residents to purchase services in the territory of another Member (e.g. tourism).
Mode 3: Commercial presence -the opportunities for foreign service suppliers to establish, operate or expand a commercial presence in the Member's territory, such as a branch, agency, or wholly-owned subsidiary (e.g. foreign direct investment).
Mode 4: Presence of natural persons -the entry and temporary stay in the Member's territory of foreign individuals in order to supply a service (expatriates).
It is clear that trade in goods is di¤erent than trade in services and though more recent agreements are covering both goods and services, it is not always the case that an FTA and an EIA are automatically signed jointly. For instance, EFTA members and Canada negotiated an FTA in 2009 without an EIA. 3 Yet, the decisions to include goods and services are not necessarily independent either; e.g. Panama and Chile decided to include both goods and services in a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2008. In particular, Lennon (2009) …nds that bilateral trade in goods explains bilateral trade in services with a positive estimated elasticity close to one. Therefore, in addition to evaluating the economic determinants of trade agreements that cover services, another contribution of this paper is to investigate any interdependence between an FTA and an EIA.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we explain in the particulars of an EIA and present the literature related to determinants of trade agreements to provide theoretical intuition of expected results. Section 3 covers the empirical strategy and the data used. In Section 4, we present our estimation results and Section 5 concludes.
EIA and Theoretical Background
As mentioned the characteristics of an EIA are very di¤erent than that of an FTA. Consequently, it is quite di¢ cult to create one general theoretical model that incorporates all of the nuances of an EIA. Therefore, we …rst provide some brief historical context an EIA and then rely on various theoretical models to provide the basis for our theoretical predictions. Figure 2 illustrates that as a share of agreements signed, services are playing a more prominent role, however there are still agreements signed that only include goods. This indicates, that there are economic variables driving the decision to negotiate over trade in goods and/or services and it is not simply an artifact of the times.
Services Under Negotiation

Related literature
We base our approach on B-B in which they provide a theoretical framework to explain the signature of FTAs between countries. In a six-country model with imperfect competition, B-B extends Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995) models. The set up is a basic Heckscher-Ohlin model characterized by two factors of production and two activities (goods and services). All …rms have the same technology and maximize pro…ts. The goods sector is capital intensive, while services are labor intensive. In each country, a representative consumer with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences maximizes utility. These six countries are located on three continents (two countries on each). Each country has to face intercontinental but also intracontinental trade costs which are null in Krugman (1991) and Frankel et al. (1995) frameworks. They assume that trade within a given continent costs less than trade between continents.
Several testable predictions arise from B-B's simulations. The determinants of FTAs are geographical (based on the di¤erence between intra-continental and intercontinental trade costs), economic (based on the di¤erence in country sizes) and rely on the di¤erences in factor endowments between partners but also between the partners and the rest of the world. Using cross-section data for the year 1996 and 1,431 country-pairs, B-B con…rm their predictions.
In fact, for 80% of country-pairs, their model predicts correctly the signature of FTA (or the absence thereof). To provide an appropriate comparison, we maintain their model but extend our analysis to consider all FTAs and EIAs signed in or before 2012. We also consider political variables as an explanatory variable. This is motivated by Baldwin and Jaimovich (2010) which …nds that in addition to economic and geographical determinants, political and a contagion index explain FTA formations. is endogenous and a hump-shaped relationship exists between the number of members of the nearest PTA and the timing of PTAs. According to , the decision to sign a BIT is more likely to occur when countries are similar and large in terms of economic size, relatively close geographically without having a common border and language.
Political stability and capital-labor ratios are also found to be important factors in determining the probability to have a BIT. Therefore, we examine economic, geographic, and political determinants in our empirical analysis to determine the FTAs and EIAs negotiations.
Turning to the issue of services, there have been various theoretical models. Markusen and Strand (2008, 2009 ) adapt the knowledge-capital model (Markusen, 2004 ) that allows three types of multinational …rms (national, horizontal and vertical) to examine the impacts of liberalizing trade and investment in business services. Markusen and Strand's work highlight that liberalizing services is mostly welfare-improving for both countries. However, smaller gains are experienced when trading partners di¤er widely in terms of economic size and factor endowments. Therefore, as with FTAs, we would expect di¤erences in GDP and capital-labor ratios to have a negative impact on the signing of EIAs. 6 Egger and Shingal (2013) 3 Empirical strategy
Speci…cations
Discrete choice models allow us to conveniently test why a country-pair has a trade agreement (see McFadden 1975 McFadden , 1976 . The probability that a given country-pair opts for a particular alternative is based on the comparison of di¤erent utilities relative to each alternative. The alternative that provides the highest utility amongst all other alternatives will be chosen.
When a country-pair decides to sign a bilateral trade agreement, it means that each signatory will be better o¤, in expectation, from this partnership than otherwise. In this framework, the utility is modeled as a latent variable, y , which is unobservable.
where x is the vector of explanatory variables; , the vector of unknown parameters and e is a normally distributed error term. However, the outcome variable, EIA, is observed
Therefore, the general form of the response probability that a country-pair chooses the alternative EIA = 1 or EIA = 0 is as following:
Following B-B's speci…cation, for the country-pair ij, the vector x is de…ned by two geographic variables: N atural ij which is the inverse of distance between i and j and Remote ij which is the simple average of the mean distance between both countries and their partners.
This latter variable is de…ned as:
where dist is the bilateral distance in kilometers and dcont ij is equal to one if i and j are located on the same continent, zero otherwise. Economic country sizes are controlled for with RGDP ij and DRGDP ij variables. The former corresponds to the sum of the logs of real GDP of country i and j, while the latter is absolute value of the di¤erence between the logs of real GDP of both countries.
The variable DKL ij is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the logs of capitallabor ratios of country i and j and the variable SQDKL ij is DKL ij squared. To compare with the rest of the world endowments, DROW KL ij is introduced and calculated as the absolute value of the di¤erence between the logs of capital-labor ratios of country i and country j and the rest of the world's capital-labor ratio,
The capital-labor ratio permits us to evaluate what each country produces and to what extent its trading partners are specialized in similar activities. We also use variables constructed of skilled-unskilled labor ratio since capital-labor ratios can be less relevant in the case of services, as services are more likely to be labor intensive activities.
We test several speci…cations, some of which assumes that the decision to sign a trade agreement on services (EIA) is dependent on (or at least correlated with) the decision to conclude a trade agreement on goods. In this case, a two-step procedure is an appropriate empirical framework where the …rst step consists of whether or not a country-pair is involved in a bilateral FTA. The second step is estimated and corresponds to whether or not this country-pair additionally signs an EIA. In the two-step estimation of a bivariate Probit, and 0 are jointly normally distributed with correlation of . The second step can be written as the following:
Thus, the two outcomes observed are:
As previously noted, x 0 is the vector of explanatory variables including N atural ij , Remote ij , RGDP ij , DRGDP ij , and the two alternative measures of factor endowments. We assume that the decision to sign an FTA and the decision to sign an EIA can be mainly explained by the same variables. However, we expect that some explanatory variables play a di¤erent role in both decisions. Note that a country pair could be involved in both an FTA and EIA in 2012, but each of these were signed in di¤erent years. This is a side-e¤ect of our "static" model. 10 We also complete our analysis with data gathered in the year 2000. There is a trade o¤ here in that we use data closer to the year of signing, but lose observations of agreements signed between 1995 and 2000. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
Data
11 European Union composed of 15 countries is Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. these speci…c cases, the decision process and welfare comparison is di¤erent as countries do not negotiate one by one, but one versus a bloc of countries. To account for these blocs, we generate aggregate countries which represent EU and EFTA by taking the sum of individual country's GDP and constructing an average distance.
12
Following the methodology of the Extended Penn World Tables, capital-labor ratios are computed from the estimated capital stock and the number of workers. 13 The calculation of the estimated capital stock is based on Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM):
with
The investment term, I t , corresponds to the real investment in year t, obtained from real investment share of GDP (k i t ), real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) noted RGDP pc t , and population (P op t ) provided by Penn World Tables (PWT) . 15 By assumption, the asset life is 14 years, the depreciation rate, d is 7.5%, and K stock t is the cumulated depreciated sum of the past investments. The capital-labor ratio is then the estimated capital stock, K stock t , divided by the number of workers, N t . From the PWT, the number of workers variable is determined as:
with RGDP w t , real GDP per worker in constant dollars. From here, two variables are generated following B-B: DKL ij and DROW KL ij .
12 Note that the GDP of EU is the sum of its …rst 15 members. The two last enlargements are not considered as most of agreements have been signed after 1995. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
Results
In this section we present our results in four main subsections. The …rst section is our baseline model that assumes the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the two countries having an FTA. Then we move on to assuming that FTA is in some sense a "prerequisite" to signing an FTA. Next, we run a seemingly unrelated model allowing for the two decisions to be correlated. Finally, we distinguish countries into two groups: developed and developing.
Baseline Results
In Table 1 , we present our baseline results. We take the potentially naïve assumption that the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the decision to sign an FTA and run Our …rst speci…cation in Table 1 corresponds to the main speci…cation in B-B. Though the signs of all our coe¢ cients except DKL match the signs for an FTA, Remote and DRGDP are insigni…cant. The fact that the coe¢ cient for DKL is negative and signi…cant, this does not necessarily contradict the typical theory for an FTA as B-B predicted a quadratic relationship and we could be on the other side of the parabola. 18 We then include a variable for incorporating the State Fragility Index in our next two speci…cations. The coe¢ cient for P olity is positive and signi…cant for both speci…cations and DKL becomes insigni…cant but still negative. We conclude from this that countries tend to select politically stable partners which is particularly important for the enforcement of EIAs as negotiations on services do not deal with observable tari¤ cuts but with market access for foreign suppliers.
19
Perhaps it is more appropriate to be concerned with the di¤erences in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor when considering an EIA. Therefore, we replace DKL and DROW KL with DSKU SK and DROW SK for our last speci…cation. With the exception of Remote which becomes signi…cant, the results for our coe¢ cients that are present in all three speci…cations in Table 1 are robust. Similar to our variable DKL, our results suggest that di¤erences in countries' skilled-unskilled labor ratio lessen the gain for signing an EIA. However, the di¤erence between the rest of the world is now positive.
There are various ways to determine how well a model …ts reality. Generally, actual and …tted values are compared to determine goodness of …t of a model. The standard metric used is the model predicts correctly if the predicted probability is above 0.5 (or below) and an EIA is actually (not) signed. Thus, all country-pairs involved in an EIA are correctly classi…ed if the associated predicted probability is such as P 0:5 and incorrectly classi…ed if P 0:5. The di¤erent options for a given country-pair can be summarized as follows:
If instead of considering a 0.5 cut-point, we select a cut-point of 0.4, we of course would have di¤erent count values in each category, and this would be true of any cut-point chosen.
Though a predicted probability of 0.5 is standard, we want to provide a richer picture. Indeed, Cameron and Trivedi (2005) highlight that a probability of 0.5 may be not appropriate depending on the sample. 20 Suppose a sample with most of country-pairs involve in an agreement, all predicted probabilities are likely to be above 0.5 (and classi…ed accordingly). Thus, a range of cut-points have to be considered in order to avoid arbitrary thresholds. We follow other studies that use the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) to compare the predictive accuracy of several models. 21 Basically, for each possible cut-point, there is a sensitivity measure (number of true positives over the number of true positives and false negatives) and a speci…city measure (number of true negatives over the number of true negatives and false positives). The receiver operating characteristic curve is generated from these measures. A perfect cut-point would classify subjects such as sensitivity and speci…city would equal one (that is a ROC curve that passes through the upper left corner).
In Figure 3 , we plot the ROC curves that correspond to speci…cation (1), (2) and (3) in Table 1 . We also run the speci…cations (1) and (2) to predict FTA signatures. Since the ROC areas (0.891 and 0.866) is higher in case of speci…cation (2), it seems that this model performs better than others to predict FTA and EIA signatures. 22 Although speci…cations (1) and (2) generate similar predictions, the ROC curve resulting from speci…cation (2) outperforms the 20 See page 474. 21 The receiver operating characteristic analysis is generally utilized in medecine. See also Schularick and Taylor (2012) for an application on …nancial crises. Note that these curves can be generated from probit and logit predictions.
See Cleves (2002) for more details. 22 To discriminate between several models, it is recommended to use the same set of observations. Thus, the sample is reduced to similar observations (4272).
other ones indicating that the political determinant is an important determinant of trade agreements. 23 We began this subsection stating that we are making a "potentially naïve" assumption that the decision to sign an EIA is completely independent of the decision to sign an FTA.
On the one hand, this is not very far fetched as there is no formal requirement that links the two decisions. Two countries (or groups of countries) can legally sign an EIA without an FTA and they have certainly signed FTAs without having an EIA. However, what is done in practice (according to the data) is that an EIA is not signed unless an FTA has also already been signed or at least signed in conjunction with an EIA. We account for the possible interdependence in the next three subsections.
FTA as a Prerequisite
As mentioned, there is no legal requirement to sign an FTA before signing an EIA, yet this is prevalent in the data. That is, when two countries decide to sign an EIA, either an FTA has been previously signed between the two countries or the two agreements are signed jointly.
This seems reasonable as there is a …xed cost to learn how to negotiate and build relationships with di¤erent countries. Moreover, since goods trade has historically been and still is the bulk of trade value, it makes sense that countries would start with an FTA. Therefore, we ask the question: given that two countries have an FTA, what are the characteristics that would make them more likely to sign an EIA? We present our results for this question in Table 2 .
There are few interesting changes in our results to point out. The …rst is that our coe¢ cient for N atural is now negative and signi…cant. This means that given two countries have already signed or are signing an agreement on goods, relatively close countries are less likely to additionally sign an EIA. This result needs to be taken with caution as countries that geographically close to each other tend to sign an FTA; i.e. we are analyzing a set of already "natural" trading partners. The same logic needs to be taken into account when interpreting the change in sign for our RGDP and DRGP variables as these coe¢ cients are not signi…cant in all speci…cations. The signs for our other variables are consistent with our previous …ndings and fairly robust. Note that our ability to correctly predict signatures is not signi…cantly di¤erent than in Table 1 . The ROC curves are presented in Figure 4 .
Seemingly Unrelated
Though informative, it is not clear that reducing the sample size and focusing only on the country pairs that have already signed an FTA is the best approach. Therefore, we next consider the situation in which the decision to sign either an EIA or FTA are separate but we allow for the possibility that the errors of the two decisions are correlated. In Table 3, we present the results of a Bivariate Probit. These results are very similar and in some cases nearly identical to our baseline results in Table 1 . The determinants in both stages are similar. When countries di¤er in terms of economic size, they tend to sign an FTA, while the remoteness discourages them. However, these two variable seem to have no impact on the signature of an EIA. The coe¢ cient for the P olity variable is positive and signi…cant in both stages. The coverage of trade negotiations expands with the political stability of both countries. Note that this stability may be particularly important for EIAs as negotiations on services do not deal with observable tari¤ cuts but with market access that the nonapplication can be more di¢ cult to prove.
As the test that is equal to zero is rejected, we can conclude that the decision to sign a FTA and the decision to sign an EIA are interrelated in all speci…cations. Thus, it is appropriate to be interested in the joint probabilities rather than both probabilities independently, though it does not appear to have a signi…cant e¤ect on our coe¢ cients. 
Agreement composition
In Table 4 , we distinguish countries according to their incomes into two groups: developing countries and developed countries. We run a Bivariate Probit when one country is in the developing countries group and the other is a developed country and another speci…cation when both countries are developing countries. Note that we cannot present the results of a Bivariate Probit for trade agreement signed between two developed countries, as we have too few observations, and almost all variables turn insigni…cant. Our results indicate that trade agreement signatures between developing and developed countries depend on political stability, economic sizes as well as di¤erence in incomes. When both countries are developing countries, the coe¢ cient of N atural is large and highly signi…cant, highlighting the importance of geographical determinants. Developing countries tend to favor neighbored trading partners. In addition, we …nd evidence of interdependent decisions for all subsamples.
Conclusion
Our goal was to highlight that trade in services is di¤erent than trade in goods and this needs to be accounted for when trying to understand why countries sign agreements for services trade. Over the past decade, trade in services and consequently trade agreements in services have become increasingly important. We take the di¤erences in trade in goods and services seriously and investigate if these di¤erences translate into di¤ering economic determinants. Though we expect and …nd similarities, we also …nd di¤erences. In particular, geography seems to be less important to determine the signatures of trade agreements on services; but economic determinants remain signi…cant for both types of trade agreement.
We …nd that smaller gains are experienced when trading partners di¤er widely in terms of economic size and factor endowments which is line with Markusen and Strand (2008, 2009 ).
Though we …nd a similar result for signing FTAs, B-B …nd a positive e¤ect for di¤erences in capital-labor ratios with a di¤erent data set. Furthermore, we …nd that di¤erences in skilled-unskilled labor ratio with the rest of the world is positive and signi…cant for EIAs but insigni…cant for FTAs. 
